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Knowledge, perception, impacts and role of lakeside communities and
institutions in the sustainable control of water hyacinth
Introduction
The massive water hyacinth mats that covered water bodies in the 1990s had
serious social and economic impacts. They affected fishing, transportation,
water quality and health of fishing communities as well as production of goods
and services of lake-based institutions (commercial establishments). At peak
infestations, the communities and institutions were aware of and participated
readily in control effort. However, after the major collapse of hyacinth in 1998,
some of them relaxed in their control efforts. The status of knowledge,
perception, impacts, preparedness and role of the lakeside communities and
institutions to control the weed has, therefore, been monitored since the major
resurgence of the weed to find out if the lakeside communities and institutions
still perceive water hyacinth as a problem and the extent to which they are
prepared to sustain control.
Perception towards infestation and resurgence
In the 1990s, the local communities and institutions fully appreciated the
magnitude of the massive weed that covered much of the shoreline and bays
as well as the floating mats in the open waters. Not only were the local
sources of the weed known but seasonal variations were also recognised.
The months of May to August were considered as the period of most severe
attacks at Gaba Fish Landing, as this was the period of strong winds blowing
from the South East, bringing the weed from the islands. The communities
and institutions regarded the weed as a major threat to their activities,
environment and health of their members. This sense of alert was maintained
until the collapse of the weed in 1998/99.
The lakeside communities and institutions visited on Lakes Victoria and
Kyoga in the monitoring survey of March 2001 following the first major
resurgence of the weed were aware of the resurgence, which they first noted
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in November 2000. However, in some areas visited, communities had not
seen extensive stationary water hyacinth that characterised previous peak
infestations. In February 2002, the communities of Wairaka and Wanyange in
Fielding Bay on Lake Victoria reported that the stationary weed had
proliferated and they had witnessed weed invasions of their beaches.
In the survey of March 2002 in which 190 respondents were interviewed at
beaches, 89% had noticed resurgence after the weed had sunk in 1998/9.
For those who said they had noticed resurgence, 40% mentioned 2001 as the
year when it occurred. Others mentioned 2000 (25%), 2002 (15%) and 1999
(6%). The respondents at the fish landings of Bulingo in Bunjako bay on Lake
Victoria, Kibuko and Kalama on rivers Kagera and Nile respectively said the
weed has always been there. Management of the commercial establishments
visited (Entebbe Water Works, Lido Beach, Uganda Railways Corporation
ferry terminal at Port Bell and Nalubaale/Kiira Dam in Jinja) reported that they
were aware of the resurgence. At Lido beach, there had been occasional
weed invasions since the year 2000 and the manager attributed the
resurgence to windy conditions experienced in this location of the lake.
Respondents at the beaches mentioned winds (63%), rains (27%) and flow of
the river (6%) as the main causes. Most respondents (83%) said that much of
the resurgent weed was mainly seen at the shoreline.
Most of those who had noticed resurgence (56%) said that the weed did not
proliferate and there was no significant change in its coverage. Some
respondents said the resurgent weed was blown away by winds (45%), while
others said it was manually removed (12%). The respondents who said the
weed had proliferated (44%), attributed it to the laxity of the communities
(39%), absence of weevils to feed on it (36%) and the fast multiplication of the
weed (19%). Some of the respondents (46%) described the current plants as
short and unhealthy while 42% described them as healthy and big.
Most of those who had noticed resurgence (55%) had encountered invasions,
which mostly occurred at their beaches (87%), other beaches (10%) and
fishing grounds (2%).
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Socio-economic impacts
At the peak of the weed infestations of the 19905, the lakeside communities
and institutions were greatly concerned about the negative socio-economic
impacts caused by the weed. With respect to fisheries, it was associated with
prolonged periods of poor fish catch. In their perception, the fishers attributed
this to the blocking of breeding grounds by the weed mats. Tilapia was said to
be the most affected fish species. Fishers also suffered increased costs in
their operations due to the weed in the following ways:
a) Fleets of gear were often carried away by mats of the weed and had to be
replaced. The weed also entangled fishers' nets, causing damage and
requiring frequent replacement.
b) The choking of outboard engines was reported as another concern among
fishers. Weed particles sucked into the engine affected the cooling system
and several fishers reported 'engine knock' as a result.
c) Boat operators also had to carry additional fuel, reported at 20 to 30 litres of
petrol per trip, during periods of weed attack to enable them to push their
way through the weed. Additional ice was also carried to save the fish from
deteriorating in quality, amounting to about a third of their usual supply.
d) •Often, boats stuck in the weed were rescued, involving additional manpower
and bigger boats, representing additional costs to operators.
Water transport was affected as the weed caused blockades to boat
passages and hindered boat landing. In a few cases, the small boats were
reported to have been engulfed in weed mats and drifted away for as long as
six hours until changes in the wind broke up the mats and released the boats.
This created real dangers on the lake for the travellers because in the
process, the children in particular suffered severe thirst and exposure to sun
heat, which affected their health.
Other health impacts of the weed included; diarrhoea, skin rash, body itching
after bathing in the affected water, cough after drinking the water and the
dangers posed by snakes, snails and mosquitoes harboured by the weed.
Communities were concerned with the effect of the weed on water quality.
They reported "pollution" of the water mainly through the weed debris, mud
resulting from the decomposing weed and pests habituating it. This hindered
their access to clean water for domestic use, given that most landings used
the lakes or rivers as their only source of water. In seasons of weed attack
residents had to pay between Shs. 200-300 for a 20-litre jerry-can of water
delivered from boreholes or protected springs situated a distance away from
the landings.
The Institutions along the lake which were seriously affected included fish
processing factories, recreational and cultural centres, water supply intakes
for Entebbe, Kampala and Jinja towns, the Uganda Electricity Board power
generation station at the former Owen Falls Dam in Jinja and the Uganda
Railways Corporation ferry terminal at Port Bell. The institutions were
affected in the following ways:
a) Fish processing factories suffered considerable losses in terms of
deterioration in the quality of fish due to delays caused by weed
blockades at the lake.
b) Activities of the water supply intakes were often halted by weed
blockages and Towns had to do with less water. Due to the rotting
weed debris, costs of water purification operations rose.
c) At recreational centres, the weed made all forms of lake games at the
beaches impossible. The rotting weed coupled with repellent odour
and green snakes discouraged tourists from visiting the sites.
d) Production of electricity at the Owen Falls Dam generation plant was
affected whenever the weed choked the water filters and turbines. The
"load shading" phenomenon that characterised the supply of Uganda's
electricity was in part due to the weed infestation. This had impact on
production in a wide range of industries utilising electricity.
In March 2001, however, most communities visited did not attribute any
negative impacts on lake-based activities to the resurgent water hyacinth.
This was because the mobile form of water hyacinth known to inflict the most
negative socio-economic impacts had not developed. However, the exception
was at the Pakwach Bridge where dislodged floating hippograss combined
with papyrus sudds and water hyacinth mats had blocked the river at the
bridge.
In the survey of March 2002, the blockade at the Pakwach bridge had
disappeared. Most respondents (63%) associated the current weed with
impacts on fish production, water transport, beach environment, water quality
and health of fishing communities. However, fewer respondents (37%) said
that the current weed did not have any impacts and attributed this to the small
sized and unhealthy plants, which have not formed mobile mats responsible
for inflicting the most negative socio-economic impacts.
Most of those who said the current weed had impacts on fish production, 48%
said the weed drifts/entangles fishing gears, covers fishing (20%) and
breeding (9%) grounds. Respondents said the weed affected water transport
most by blocking transport routes (58%) wherever there was an invasion,
affected beach environment/surrounding most by making the beach muddy
(57%), and affected water quality most by making it muddy (45%). However,
most respondents (54%) said that the current weed did not have any impacts
on health of fishing communities. Only a few respondents said the weed
affected the health of fishing communities when it harboured snakes (18%),
snails (13%) and mosquitoes (6%) suggesting that the health problems
attributed to the weed had been reduced.
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At Entebbe Water Works, management reported that they had not faced any
impacts from the current weed on their water purifying processes since they had
maintained infrastructure that prevents any blockage of the pumps and choking
of the filters. At Nalubaale and Kiira power dams, management reported that
they had not faced any impacts on their power generation activities because the
weed has not been given the opportunity to form mats because it is effectively
removed. At Uganda Railways Corporation ferry terminal at Port Bell,
management also reported that they had not faced any impact on their docking
activities. At Lido beach, however, the occasional weed invasions made the
beach untidy and dirty for any swimming and other beach games.
Local community and institutional preparedness
At the peak of weed infestation, weed control was carried out at both the
community and institutional levels, involving physical removal and biological
control methods. At the fish landings, communal removal was carried out
under the supervision of the Water Hyacinth Management Committees
(WHMC), utilising implements mostly supplied by the Water Hyacinth Control
Unit (WHCU), Entebbe and UFFCA. The method was helpful at controlling
the weed at many landings. However, it was not sustainable as it required
community members to put in considerable amount of their labour and time, at
the expense of their own livelihood activities. Furthermore, due to inadequate
protective gear, it exposed people to a variety of health risks.
At the institutional level, the establishments erected structures, acquired
equipment and set up teams to control the weed. Some of the examples were
as follows:
a) Gomba fish factory had to construct a pier at a cost of Shs 9.6 million
to improve boat landing. Marine and agro fish factory constructed a
jetty to increase accessibility to the lake at a similar cost.
b) Uganda Electricity Board fabricated a metallic boat for weed control at
Shs 2.3 million.
,Some institutions employed a standing work force of between 3 to 20 persons
to control the weed, at an average wage of Shs 100,000 per person per
month. In addition, they hired more labour as and when required, paying
them an average of Shs 4,000 per person per day. They also equipped them
with implements including rakes, gumboots, wheelbarrows and overalls.
Boats and outboard engines were also frequently deployed.
In March 2001, it was found out that most of the newly established LMCs at
beaches had assumed activities of the former Water Hyacinth Management
Committees (WHMC). Some communities had also received equipment from
the DFR and UFFCA to help in the manual control of the weed, although
some of the equipment had been worn out. At commercial establishments, it
was reported that personnel. equipment or structures for the control of the
weed had continued to be maintained.
In March 2002, most respondents (76%) said they still had beach
committees/authorities that were charged with the duty of spearheading
control of the current weed. The most commonly mentioned
committees/authorities were LMCs (52%), Gabunga (26%), DFR staff (17%)
and Water Hyacinth Management Committee (2%). Respondents were asked
whether the above beach authorities/committees were still playing an active
role in controlling the current weed and most of them (72%) agreed and
mentioned mobilisation of the community for manual removal (82%), soliciting
for funds to pay hired labourers (14%) and maintaining weevil nurseries (4%).
The few respondents (28%) who said the above committees were not active
mostly attributed it to the absence of serious weed threat at their beaches
(80%), lack of community support (12%) and equipment (4%).
Most respondents (58%) said that there were special measures instituted at
their beaches to manually control the weed and these included, bye-laws
formulated to oblige every community member to participate in or contribute
funds/fish for the manual removal of the weed (83%) and declared a special
day in a week or when the weed invades the beach for manual removal (8%).
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At some beaches, fishers were asked to carry along with them some plants
whenever they returned from fishing (5%).
Twelve out of the fourteen beaches visited had ever received equipment for
control of the weed. Kalama fish landing near Namasagali on Victoria Nile
and Namoni on Lake Victoria had never received any equipment. Wanseko
and Mubogo received their equipment from the District authorities through the
DFO while Bukungu and Kansiira received equipment from UFFCA. None of
the beaches had ever procured their own equipment indicating high
dependency on Government. This may not be sustainable. An inventory of
the equipment was taken (Table 1.1) and as noted most of the equipment was
either worn out or lost.
Three of the surveyed beaches had weevil nurseries. At Majanji, Wakawaka
and Kibuko/Kagera, the nurseries had been relatively well maintained as
reported by most respondents (55%). At Bukungu fish landing, all
respondents said the nursery was no longer in existence because the facilities
had been washed away by EI nino. However, most respondents (83%) said
that there was need to establish weevil nurseries at their beaches, because
they feared weed invasions (42%), the fact that the weed is there to stay
(33%) and weed proliferation (18%).
Respondents were asked to mention their most preferred method that would
be effective for the control of the current weed and most of them (62%)
mentioned biological control, followed by those who mentioned physical
removal (28%) and chemical spray (6%). Respondents at Kibuuko fish
landing on River Kagera suggested a re-establishment of the boom as the
most effective control of the weed in that riverine environment.
All committee members/authorities charged with the duty of spearheading
control of the weed complained of a number of problems faced in discharging
their duties. These included lack of equipment, lack of willingness on the part
of community members to manually remove the weed and lack of facilitation
for them as beach authorities.
As other efforts that should be put in place to help in the control of the weed at
community level, respondents suggested assistance from Government such
as replacement of worn out equipment (67%), re/establishment of weevil
nurseries (26%) and payment of allowances to authorities/committee
members that are charged with duty of spearheading control activities (5%).
Management of the four establishments reported that they had continued to
maintain personnel, equipment or structures to control the weed. At Entebbe
Water Works, it was reported that they had maintained a steel cage around the
intake point, which prevents the weed from blocking the pumps and choking the
filters. In addition, when the weed invades the intake point, the service men
remove the weed and throw it away. However, they regularly incur maintenance
costs to ensure that the structure is effective in controlling the weed debris. The
management also reported that they would be willing to contribute towards
national control efforts through provision of knowledge/advice. Since they are
well equipped with qualified personnel and good facilities like laboratories, they
would play an active role in the control of water hyacinth
At Lido beach, a team of casual labourers was in place to manually remove
the weed whenever it invaded.
At Nalubaale and Kiira power dams, management reported that they
contributed Shs. 300,000/= per month for the fuelling of the machinery of the
onshore stationary system at the dams and also promised to continue with the
facilitation. They have also put in place and maintained four sets of booms to
trap the free-floating weeds at the source of River Nile, nose of the new canal,
Nalubaale and Kiira dam which are later removed. They also clean the water
screens as part of their routine activities.
At Uganda Railways Corporation ferry terminal at Port Bell, management
reported that they contributed to the facilitation of the mobile harvester system
and also pledged to continue with this support. They also monitor weed
attack in the bay and keep the supervisor of the mobile system informed.
Table 1.1: An inventory of equipment supplied to fish landings for water
hyacinth control
Fish landing Equipment No. No. No. No.
Received Workinq Unusable Lost
Bukungu Wheel burrows 5 5
Rakes 10 10
Hip boots/waders 5 5
Gloves 5 pairs 5 pairs
Forks 10 10
Kansiira Wheel burrows 1 1
Rakes 2
Panqas 2 1 1
Forks 2 2
Kagwara Wheel burrows 2 2
Rakes 4 4
Hip boots/waders 1 pair 1
Gloves 2 pairs 2
Panaas 2 2
Forks 2 2
Wanseko Wheel burrows 4 2 2
Gum boots 2 2
Rakes 2 2
Panaas 1 1
Spades 2 2
Forks 2 2
Mubogo Wheel burrows 1 1
Gum boots 1 1
Ggaba Wheel burrows 5 3 2
Rakes 15 10 5
Gum boots 3 pairs 3 pairs
Hip boots 2 pairs 2 pairs
Gloves 10 pairs 10 pairs
Panqas 15 15
Overalls 2 2
Forks 10 5 5
Wakawaka Wheel burrows 2 2
Rakes 25 4 21
Gum boots 7 pairs 7 pairs
Hip boots 2 pairs 2 pairs
Gloves 25 pairs 25 pairs
Panqas 25 25
Majanji Wheel burrows 2 2
Rakes 2 2
Forks 1 1
Bulingo Wheel burrows 1 1
Rakes 2 2
Hip boots 2 pairs 2 pairs
,Fish landing Equipment No. No. No. No.
Received Workina Unusable Lost
Gloves 2 pairs 1 pair 1 pair
PanQas 4 4
Forks 2 2
Kibuko/Kagera Wheel burrows 25 3 22
Rakes 25 25
Gum boots 25 pairs 1 pair 24
oairs
Hip boots 25 pairs 1 pair 24
pairs
Gloves 25 pairs 1 pair 24
pairs
PanQas 25 25
Overalls 25 25
Kitubulu Wheel burrows 1 1
Rakes 1 1 5
Source: March 2002 Survey data
